THE MONITORING ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN VIETNAM FROM A RETURN-VOLATILITY PERSPECTIVE
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Anh Tho To
Quoc Tuan Tran
Thi Siem Tran
Kim Phong Thai
Thi Thu Hong Ho
Quoc Tuan Tran
Thi Siem Tran
Kim Phong Thai
Thi Thu Hong Ho
Abstract
This study examines the relevance of board independence to stock return volatility for a sample of 160 compa-nies listed on the Vietnamese stock market over ten years (2008–2017). After control-ling for potential endogeneity, we find that the presence of non-executive directors on the board tends to increase firm risk. The results indicate that non-executive direc-tors do not play a supervisory role under the agency theory. Our findings remain ro-bust when we apply alternative measures of the dependent variable.
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How to Cite
Tho To, A., Tuan Tran, Q., Siem Tran, T., Phong Thai, K., & Thu Hong Ho, T. (2020). THE MONITORING ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN VIETNAM FROM A RETURN-VOLATILITY PERSPECTIVE. Economic Annals, 65(224), 29-52. https://doi.org/10.2298/EKA2024029T
How to Cite
Tho To, A., Tuan Tran, Q., Siem Tran, T., Phong Thai, K., & Thu Hong Ho, T. (2020). THE MONITORING ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN VIETNAM FROM A RETURN-VOLATILITY PERSPECTIVE. Economic Annals, 65(224), 29-52. https://doi.org/10.2298/EKA2024029T